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Abstract 
We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic games with arbitrary state and action 
spaces, a finitely additive law of motion and limit superior payoff function. The players 
use finitely additive strategies and it is shown that such a game has a value, if the payoff 
function is evaluated in accordance with the theory of strategic measures as developed by 
Dubins and Savage. Moreover, when a Borel structure is imposed on the problem, 
together with an equicontinuity condition on the law of motion, the value of the game is the 
same whether calculated in terms of countably additive strategies or finitely additive ones. 
AMS 1980 subject classification: Primary 90D15, Secondary 60040. 
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1. Introduction 
Every two-person, zero-sum, one day game with a bounded payoff function has a 
value if the players are allowed to use randomized strategies which are finitely additive and 
if the order of integration is fixed. (This follows from Ky Fan (4, Theorem 2]. A direct 
proof of the result can be found in Heath and Sudderth [5].) We prove in Theorem 2.1 that 
the same result holds for stochastic games with arbitrary state and action spaces and a law 
of motion which corresponds to a finitely additive conditional distribution. The payoff 
function we study is sufficiently general to include the classical ones such as the long run 
average reward and the total discounted reward. As far as we are aware, stochastic games 
in which the law of motion is finitely additive and where the players are allowed to use 
randomized strategies that are finitely additive have not been studied before, even in the 
case of the total discounted reward. 
The model of stochastic games we consider here was studied in the countably 
additive setting in [6] and [7]. In [7], it was shown that Borel measurable, countably 
additive stochastic games have values under appropriate measurability and topological 
assumptions. In these Borel games players are required to use measurable, countably 
additive strategies and it is natural to ask if the value would be the same if they were 
allowed to use finitely additive strategies. As shown in Corollary 9 .3, the value is the same 
under a condition of equicontinuity on the law of motion. 
Our study of finitely additive stochastic games and Borel stochastic games is based 
on analogous work in the Dubins and Savage theory of gambling [1]. 
2. Formulation of the problem in the finitely additive setting 
Let X, A, B be nonempty sets. Let u be a bounded, real-valued function on X and 
q a function which assigns to each triple (x,a,b) e Xx Ax Ba finitely additive probability 
measure defined on the power-set of X. The game 7l(u)(x) stans at some initial state x. 
Player I chooses an action a1 e A and, simultaneously, player II chooses b1 e B. (The 
players may choose their actions at random, which means that the players choose their 
actions according to finitely additive probability distributions defined on the power-sets of 
their respective action sets.) The next state x1 has distribution q(•lx,a1,b1) and is 
announced to the players along with their chosen actions. The procedure is iterated so as to 
generate a random sequence x1,x2, •.. and the payoff from II to I is 
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We will next indicate how the distribution of the random sequence x1,x2,··· is defined in 
the finitely additive theory. 
A strategy a for player I is a sequence ao,a 1,a2, ... such that a 0 e P(A) and, for 
n ~ 1, a 0 is a mapping from zn into P(A), where Z = A x B x X and P(A) is the set of all 
finitely additive probability measures on the power-set of A. One defines a strategy t for 
player II in an analogous manner, with P(A) replaced by P(B), the set of finitely additive 
probability measures on the power-set of B. 
Associated with the stochastic games n(u)(x), x e X, is a gambling house, in the 
sense ofDubins and Savage [1], defined as follows. 
Define the state space to be Y = X u Z. For each triple (x,µ,v) e X x P(A) x 
P(B), let m(x,µ,v) be the finitely additive probability measure on the power-set of Z 
defined by 
m(x,µ,v)(F) = JI q(Fa,blx,a,b) dµ(a) dv(b), 
where F s Zand Fa,b = {x e X: (a,b,x) e F}. Here the order of integration is important 
and throughout this article we will integrate in the order adopted above. We can now 
complete the definition of the gambling house. Set 
r(x) = {m(x,µ,v): µ e P(A), v e P(B)}, x e X, 
and 
r(z) = {m(x,µ,v): µ E P(A), VE P(B)}, 
where z = (a,b,x) e Z. 
Let a,t be strategies for players I and II, respectively, in the game n(u)(x.). Then a 
and t induce a strategy <CJ,'t> in the gambling houser as follows: 
<CJ,t>o = m(x,ao,to) 
and, for n ~ 1, 
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<er, 't>n(Y1 ,Y2,---,Y n) = m(xn,O'n(Y 1 ,Y2, ... ,y n), 'tn(Y1 ,Y2,···,Y n)), 
if (Y1 ,•••,Yn) e 2° and Yn = (an,bn,Xn) 
= m(xn,cro,'to) if (Y1 ,Y2,•••,Yn) ~ zn and Yn = (an,bn,Xn) or Xn. 
Then <er, 't> is a strategy available at x e X in the gambling house rand therefore 
induces a finitely additive probability measure Px,a;t on the Borel subsets of yN, where 
N = { 1,2, ... } and Y N is endowed with the product of copies of the discrete topology on 
Y. The probability measure Px,a;r was defined on the field of clopen sets by Dubins and 
Savage [1] and then extended to the Borel a-field by Dubins [2] and Purves and Suddenh 
[10]. In the sequel we shall freely use the propenies established for Px,a,t by Dubins-
Savage-Purves-Suddenh in [1], [2] and [10]. Note that Px,a,t (ZN)= 1. 
To return to the game n(u)(x), we can now define the expected payoff that accrues 
to player I from player II, when I uses a and II uses 't, as 
Ex,a,t(u*) =Ju* dPx,a;c· 
In the sequel, we will sometimes drop x, especially when it is clear from the context, and 
write P a,t and Ea;t for Px,a;r and Ex,a,t, respectively. 
The upper and lower values V(x), V(x) of the game n(u)(x) can be defined in the 
usual manner: 
and 
V(x) = inf sup Ex,a,t<u*) 
't O' 
V(x) = sup inf Ex a -r<u*), 
O' 't ' ' 
where the sup is over all strategies er of player I and the inf is over all strategies 't of player 
II. 
Theorem 2.1. For every x e X, the game n(u)(x) has a value, that is, 
V(x) = V(x). 
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3. Notation. 
Let Z = A x B x X and define the space of histories to be H = zN = Z x Z x .... 
Elements ofH will be denoted by h = (z1,z2, ... ). We use p0 (h), or more briefly, Pn to 
denote the panial history (z1 ,z2, ... ,Zo)-
Suppose a is a strategy for player I in the stochastic game and p = (z1,zi, ... ,z0) a 
partial history. Then the conditional strategy a[p] is defined by 
I I I I t t 
a[p]m(~ ,2.i' ... ,zm) = On+mCz1 ,z2, ... ,Zn,2J ,2.i , ... ,zm) 
I I I 
for all m c? 1 and <zi ,Zi , ... ,zm) e zm. If 'tis a strategy for player II, the definition of the 
conditional strategy t[p] is similar. Given strategies cr and 't for players I and II, an initial 
state x e X and a bounded, Borel measurable function g: H ~ 9t, we have: 
where, for p = p0 (h) = (z1 ,z2, ... ,z0 ), gp is the p-section of g defined on H by gp(h') = 
I I t t 
gp(, ,Z_i, ••• ) = g(z1 ,z2,---,Zn,2i ,2.i,···>· In the special case when g(h) = u*(h) = 
lim
0
sup u(x0 ),u*p is just u* and (3.1) simplifies to 
Ea;t(u*) = J {Ea[Pn(h)],'t[Pn(h)](u*)} dP a,t(h). 
In the conventional, countably additive theory, formula (3.1) would be an instance of the 
familiar fact that the expectation of a random variable can be written as the expectation of its 
conditional expectation given another random variable or sigma-field. In the finitely 
additive theory of Dubins and Savage, it was proved for finitary (continuous) gin [1] and, 
more generally, for bounded, Borel gin [10]. 
A stogpin g; time t is a mapping from H to { 0, 1, ... } u { oo} such that, for 
n = 0,1, ... , if t(h) = n and h' agrees with h in the first n coordinates, then t(h') = n. Note 
that if t(h) = 0 for some h, then t is identically zero. A stQp rule is a stopping time which is 
everywhere finite. 
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If tis a stopping time, h = (z1,z2,---) = ((a1,b1,x1),(a2,b2,x2), ... ), and t(h) < oo, 
we define the variables Zt,xt,Pt to have values Zt(h), xt(h), Pt(h) = (z1 ,z2, ... ,Zt(h)) at h. For 
strategies a and 't of players I and II, formula (3.1) generalizes to 
Like formula (3.1), formula (3.2) was proved for finitary gin [1] and then extended to 
bounded, Borel g in [ 11]. 
If t is a stop rule and p = (z 1 ,z2, ... ,z0 ) a panial history, define t[p] on H by 
' ' ' ' t[p](7i ,42, ... ) = t(z1 ,z2, ... ,z0 ,7 ,42, ... ) - n. 
Notice that, if t(z1,z2, ... ,z0 , ••• ) ~ n, then t[p] is itself a stop rule, in which case t[p] is 
called a conditional stop rule given p. When p = (z), we write z for p and t[z] for t[p]. 
There is a natural way to associate with every stop rule t an ordinal number j(t) 
called the index oft by setting j(O) = 0 and requiring, for t > 0, that 
j(t) = sup{j(t[z]) + 1: z e Z}. 
The ordinal function j(t) is familiar to students of Dubins and Savage as being the structure 
of the finitary function Zt([l,sections 2.7 and 2.9]) except for the uninteresting case when Z 
is a singleton. Some of our proofs will use transfinite induction on j(t) and it is important 
to notice that, for all t > 0 and all z e Z, j(t[z]) is strictly less than j(t). 
Suppose t > 0 is a stop rule and consider the special case of (3.1) when n = 1 and 
g = u(xJ. Note that 
if we make the convention that x1[zi](z2,z3, ... ) = x1 when t[z1] = 0. Then (3.1) yields 
7 
4. Auxiliruy games 
Consider an auxiliary one-day game 02( <p )(x) starting from x, where <p is a bounded 
function on X. In the game C?2(q>)(x), players I and II choose actions a,b simultaneously 
with a e A and b e B and the payoff from II to I is 
The expected payoff from II to I when I plays a random strategy µ e P(A) and II plays v e 
P(B) is 
JJJ q>(x1) q(dx1 lx,a,b) dµ(a) dv(b), 
which we abbreviate by cp(µ,v). Again the order of integration is important and is 
consistent with the order of integration adopted in section 2. Note that <p(µ,v) is just the 
expectation of <p with respect to the probability measure m(x,µ,v). 
Lemma 4.1. For any bounded function q> on X and any x e X, the game <12(q>)(x) has 
value (S<p)(x), that is, 
(S<p)(x) = inf sup <p(µ,v) = sup inf ip(µ,v). 
VE P(B) µe P(A) µe P(A) VE P(B) 
Moreover, both players have optimal strategies, which may be random. 
Lemma 4.1 is an easy consequence of Theorem 2 in Ky Fan [4]. 
Next, we define functions U~ by transfinite induction on~ as follows: 
and, for ; > 0, 
Uo=u 
U~ = SU11 Vu 
= sup u11 
. 11<; 
if;= Tl+ 1 
if ; is limit, 
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where a V bis the maximum of a and b. Let 
Lemma 4.2. U is the least, bounded function <p on X such that (a) <p ~ u and (b) <p ~ Sq>. 
f[QQ!. First, note that the operator Sis monotone. So, if <p satisfies (a) and (b), then, by 
transfinite induction on~, <p ~ Ul; for every~- Plainly, U ~ u. Moreover, U; ~ u11 if11 < 
~- So there is~· such that U;• = Ul;*+t' as can be seen by using an easy cardinality 
argument. It follows that U = U;•· Hence, 
su = sul;. ~ ul;*+t = u. D 
Lemma 4.3. U = u v SU. 
fmm. Choose an ordinal~· such that Ul;. = Ul;*+t· It follows that U = U;*· Hence 
u = u;*+t = u v sul;. = u v su. D 
Now consider a game ,Z:(u)(x), determined by an initial position x and the utility 
function u and played exactly.like the game 7l(u)(x) of section 2, except that now player I 
gets to terminate the game unilaterally at any time of his choice and the payoff to I from II is 
the value of u at the tenninal state. More formally, I chooses a strategy a and a stop rule t, 
II chooses a strategy 't and the expected payoff to I from II is Ex,a,t(u(x1)). Here we allow 
t = 0 and require xo = x. 
The next three lemmas will prove that the game .Z:(u)(x) has value U(x). 
Lemma 4.4. For every x e X, ordinal ~ ~ 0 and e > 0, I has a strategy a~x) and a stop 
rule t~x) such that for any strategy 't of II, 
(4.1) E; (u(x; ))~Ul;(x)-e 
aE(x),t tE(x) 
for every x e X. 
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Proof. Fixµ* e P(A). For~= 0, let t~(x) = 0 and cr~(x) be the strategy which usesµ* 
every day. 
Assume the result is true for all Tl < ~- Let ~ be a limit ordinal. Set 
t~(x)(h) = 0 if u(x) ~ U;(x) 
= tit>(h) if u(x) < U~(x), 
where n(x) is the least Tl such that U11(x) ~ U;(x) - £/2; and 
cr~(x) = cr~(x) if u(x) ~ U;{x) 
= cr~~)(x) if u(x) < U;{x). 
It is easy to verify that cr~(x) and t~(x) satisfy ( 4.1 ). 
Suppose next that ~ = 11+ 1. For each x e X, let f(x) e P(A) be optimal for I in the 
game <1l(U11)(x). Consider as above two cases. 
Case 1. 
and 
u(x) ~ U~(x). Then define 
cr~(x) = cr~(x) 
Now (4.1) is obvious. 
Case 2. u(x) < U~(x). Then set 
cr~(x)o = f(x) 
cr;(x)0 (z1 ,z2, ... ,z0 ) = cri(x 1 )0 _ 1 (z2,z3, ... ,z0 ),n ~ 1, 
t!(x)(h) = t:1(x1)(z2,z3, ... ) + 1. 
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So, if 't is any strategy of player II, then 
E ~ (u(x ~ )) 
a/x),'t t/x) 
~ IJJ U11(x 1) q(dx 1 lx,a,b) f(x) (da) 'to(db) - E 
~ (SU11 )(x) - E 
= U~(x) - e. D 
Lemma 4.5. For every x e X and e > 0, player I has a strategy O'E(x) and a stop rule te(x) 
such that for any 't played by II, 
(4.2) Eae(x),'t(u(x1t(x))) ~ U(x) - E 
for every x e X. 
Proof. Choose an ordinal ~ * such that U = U ~ .... Define 
and 
~· te(x) = te (x), x e X, 
where a;*(~) and tr (x) are as in Lemma 4.4. Lemma 4.5 follows immediately from 
Lemma4.4. D 
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Lemma 4.6. For every x e X, player II has a strategy 't(x) such that for any strategy a of I 
and any stop rule t, 
for every x e X. 
Proof. For every x e X, let g(x) e P(B) be optimal for II in the game a2(U)(~). Define 
-c(x)0 =g(x) 
and 
Suppose now that a is a strategy of I and ta stop rule. We will prove (4.3) by induction 
onj(t). Fort= 0, (4.3) is obvious. For the inductive step, calculate as follows: 
Ea,t(x)(u(xt)) = JI u(Xt[z1]) dP a[z1];t(x)[z1] dP a,t(x) 
= JI U(X1[z1]) dP a[z1]:t(x1) dP a,t(x) 
SJ U(x1) dPa,t(x) 
= JJJ U(x1) q(dx1lx,a,b) ao(da) g(x)(db) 
s (SU)(x) 
S U(x), 
where the first inequality is by virtue of the inductive hypothesis and the last one is by 
virtue of Lemma 4.2. D 
Combining Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, we get: 
Theorem 4.7. For every x e X, the game .Z:(u)(x) has value U(x). 
As the final auxiliary game, we consider a modification .Z:*(u)(x) of the game 
.Z:(u)(x). In the game _z:*(u)(x), player I chooses a strategy a and a stop rule t ~ 1, player 
II chooses a strategy 't and the expected payoff from II to I is Ex,a,t(u(xt)). The only 
difference between the games .Z:*(u)(x) and ~(u)(x) is that in the fonner, I is not allowed 
to choose t = 0. 
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Theorem 4.8. For every x e X and every E > 0, I has a strategy aE(x) and a stop rule te(x) 
~ 1 such that for any strategy 't of II, 
E ( ) (u(x ( ))) ~ (SU)(x) - e. 
0£ X ,'t 1£ X 
Moreover, for every x e X, II has a strategy 't(x) such that for any strategy a of I and any 
stop rule t ~ 1, 
Lastly, for every x e X, the game .i:*(u)(x) has value (SU)(x). 
Proof. Let X be a copy of X and disjoint with X. If x e X, its copy in X will be denoted 
by x. Consider a new problem with state space X u X, the same action sets A,B as in the 
original problem, the same utility u and the same law of motion q on X and extended to X 
as follows, 
u(x) = inf{ u(y): ye X} - 1 
and 
q(•lx,a,b) = q(•lx,a,b). 
Note that, for any x e X, the game Z(u)(x) is equivalent to .i:*(u)(x) because I will not 
have any incentive to use t = 0 if the starting state is x. Consequently, U(x), the value of 
the game Z(u)(x), will also be value of the game .i:*(u)(x). By Lemma 4.3, 
U (x) = u(x) v (SU)(x) = (SU)(x) = (SU)(x). 
Hence the value of Z*(u)(x) is (SU)(x). The remaining assertions follow by applying 
Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 to the games .i:(u)(x), x e X, and by recalling from the proof 
of Lemma 4.6 that for any x e X, any strategy a of I and any stop rule t ~ 1, 
Ea,t(x) (u(x1)) S SU(x). D 
We now define a new operator T by setting for any bounded, real-valued function 
wonX 
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(Tw)(x) = value of the game Z*(w)(x), x e X. 
5. Proof of Theorem 2.1. 
We now return to the games n(u)(x). We will need for the proof of Theorem 2.1 a 
preliminary result from the Dubins-Savage theory of gambling, which will enable us to 
approximate the game n(u)(x) by the game .Z:*(u)(x). 
Lemma 5.1. Let o-,t be strategies for players I and II, respectively. Then, for any x e X, 
(5.1) f u*dPx en= inf sup f u(xt) dPx a 't' 
, ' s t~s , , 
where s,t run over stop rules which are ~ 1. 
Formula (5.1) is called the Fatou equation and was proved in the countably additive 
setting by Sudderth (12] and then extended to the finitely additive setting by Purves and 
Suddenh [9, Theorem 9.4]. 
Theorem 5.2. Suppose cp is a bounded, real-valued function on X such that T(u /\ cp) ~ cp. 
Then V ~ cp. 
00 
Proof. Let £ > 0. Choose 60 , n ~ 0, such that 60 > 0 and r, 60 < £. By Theorem 4.8, for 
0 
each x e X and n ~ 0, I has a strategy a 0 (x) and a stop rule t0 (x) ~ 1 such that for any 
strategy t of II, 
(5.2) E ~ (u A cp(x ( ))) ~ (T(u A cp))(x) - 60 O (X),'t "it X 
Let a(x) be the sequential composition of (a0 ,t0 ), n ~ 0, at x as defined in Dubins et 
al. [3]. In detail, first define stop rules 1 ~ so(x) < s1(x) < ... by setting for h = (z1,z2, ••• ), 
so(x)(h) = to(x)(h) 
and 
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Sn+ I (x)(h) = Sn(X)(h) + tn+ 1 (zsn(x))(zsn(x)+ J ,Zsn(x)+2,···>· 
[Recall that z1(h) = Zt(h) for a stop rule t and he H.] Now define a(x) as follows: 
a(x)o = aO(x)0 
a(x)0 (z1,z2,···,zn) = aO(x)n(z1 ,z2,···,Zn) if 1 S: n < so(x)(h) 
= ak+ 1 (Zsk(x))n-sk(x)Czsk(x)+ 1,Zsk(X)+2,···,Zn) 
if sk(x)(h) S n < Sk+l (x)(h), 
where h = (z1 ,z2, ... ,zn,···>· Thus, a(x) follows a 0(x) up to time so(x), then switches to 
a 1(x80(x)) and so on. 
We claim that for every x e X and stop rule s ~ 1, there is a stop rule t ~ s such that 
for every strategy t of player Il, 
00 
(5.3) Ex a(x) t(u(xt)) ~ cp(x) - L On· 
' ' 0 
The claim will be proved by induction on the index j(s). 
Fix x0 e X and write a for a(xo). To start the induction, suppose that s = 1. Let t 
= to(xo). Then, for any strategy t of II, 
Exo,a:r(u(x1)! = EaO(xo)_t<u(xto<xo))) 
;::: EaO(xo)/u /\ cp(xto<xo>» 
;::: cp(xo) - oo 
where the second inequality is by virtue of (5.2). 
For the inductive step, assume that j(s) > 1 and that the claim is true for all stop 
rules s' ~ 1 with j(s') < j(s). Write to for to(xo). 
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Fix h E Hand suppose that s(h) > to(h). Let sh = s[pto(h)], so that j(sh) < j(s). Set 
ah= a[pto(h)], so that crh is the sequential composition of (a0 ,t0 ), n ~ 1, at xto. Apply the 
inductive hypothesis to crh, sh, xto to get a stop rule th (depending on h only through 
p10(h)) ~ sh such that for every strategy 't' of II 
Now define, for any h e H, 
t(h) = to(h) + fh<zto+ltzto+2, ... ) if to(h) < s(h), 
= t0(h) if s(h) s t0(h). 
Then t is a stop rule and it is straightforward to verify that t ~ s. Hence, for any strategy 't 
of II, 
00 
~ J (sst0} u(xt ) dP en + J {s>t0} <p(x1 ) dP cr t - 2, 60 0 ' . O ' I 
00 
= Exo,crO(xo)/u /\ <p(xto)) - t On 
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where the first inequality is by virtue of (5.4) and the penultimate equality is by virtue of 
(5.2). 
It now follows from the claim and Lemma 5.1 that for any x e X and any strategy 't 
of II, 
Ex,a(x),t(u*) ~ <p(x) - E, 
so that 
V(x) ~ <p(x) - E. 
Since E is arbitrary, this completes the proof. D 
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 2.1, it now remains to prove 
Theorem 5.3. T(u /\ V) ~ V. 
Proof. Fix x e X and E > 0. Let t 1 be optimal for II in the game Z*(u /\ V)(x), that is, 
- -(5.5) E0 ,t1(u /\ V(xt)) ~ (T(u /\ V))(x) 
for any strategy CJ of I and any stop rule t ~ 1. Next, for each y e X, choose a strategy 
i:(y) for II such that for all strategies CJ of I, 
(5.6) * - E E _ (u )<V(y)+ 2 . y,a,t(y) 
The existence of t 1 follows from Theorem 4.8 and that of i:(y) from the definition of V(y). 
Let 
t(h) = inf {k ~ 1: u(xk) > V(xk)}, 
where inf (<I>) = oo. Plainly, i is a stopping time. Now define 't as follows: 
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= if(x_) _(z_ ,z_ , ... ,z
0
) if t(h) S n, 
t n-t t+l t+2 
where h =(z1 ,z2, ... ,z0 , ••• ). 
Fix a strategy a for player I. We will show that there is a stop rule s ~ 1 such that 
for all stop rules t ~ s, 
(5.7) Ex,a,t(u(xt)) ~ (T(u /\ V))(x) + E. 
It follows from (5.7) and Lemma 5.1 that 
Ea;r(u*) S (T(u /\ V))(x) + e. 
Since a is arbitrary, this implies that 
- -V(x) S (T(u /\ V))(x) + e. 
(\.s e is arbitrary, this will complete the proof of the theorem, once we have established 
(5.7). 
To prove (5.7), use [11, Lemma 1) to choose a stop rules~ 1 such that 
(5.8) Pa,t ({t<oo}) SPa,tC(iSs}) + 4(11u~l+l). 
Use Lemma 5.1 and (5.6) to choose, for each p = (z1,z2, ... ,z0 }, a stop rule r(p) ~ 1 stich 
that 
(5.9) 
for all stop rules t ~ r(p). 
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Define a stop rule s as follows: 
s(h) = t(h) + r(p_(h))(z_ ,z_ , ... ) if t(h) s s(h), 
t t+l t+2 
= s(h) if i(h) > s(h), 
where h = (z1 ,z2, ... ). 
Let t be a stop rule such that t ~ s. Condition on p _ and calculate as follows: 
tAt 
= J - E (u(x )) dP {I.St) x_,cr[p_],t(x_} t[p_] O',t 
t t l t 
J . £ < - E ( u (x )) dP + -
- (tSS} x...,cr[p_ ],t(x_) t[p_] O',t 4 
l l t l 
J - 3£ J S (i'ss] V(x,2 dP cr,t + 4 + {t>t} u(x1) dP cr,t 
SJ (i'st) V(x,2 dP cr,t + £ + J (t>t} u(x1) dP cr,t 
= J(u A V)(x_ ) dPcr ,p + £ 
tAt '" 
= J ( u A V)(x_ ) dP 1 + £ tAt O','t 
S (T(u A V))(x) + £, 
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where the first inequality uses (5.8) and the set inclusions { tSs) s ( i'St) s { i' <oo}, the 
second inequality is by virtue of (5.9) and the fact that on {tSs), t[p-] ~ s[p-] = r(p~), and 
l l l 
the last inequality is by vinue of (5.5). D 
6. Borel stochastic games 
In [7], we studied stochastic games in a Borel measurable setting. More precisely, 
we made the following assumptions: 
(i) X and A are Borel subsets of Polish spaces. 
(ii) B is a compact metric space. 
(iii) q is a Borel measurable transition function, that is, for each (x,a,b) e X ><A>< B, 
q(•lx,a,b) is a countably additive probability measure on the Borel CJ-field of X, and 
for each Borel subset E of X, q(EI•,•,•) is Borel measurable on X ><A>< B. 
(iv) For every fixed Borel subset E of X, x e X and a e A, q(Elx,a,•) is continuous on B. 
(v) u is a bounded, upper analytic function on X, that is, for every real c, the set { u>c} is 
analytic. 
Furthermore, both players are required to use measurable strategies. Recall that a 
measurable strategy a for player I is a sequence cro,a1 , ... , where a0 e P c(A), the set of 
countably additive probability measures on the Borel subsets of A, and, for n ~ 1, CJ0 is a 
universally measurable mapping from 2° to Pc(A) (that is, measurable when zn is endowed 
with its a-field of universally measurable subsets and P c(A) is equipped with the Borel CJ-
field generated by the weak topology on P c(A)). A measurable strategy 't for player II is 
defined analogously. 
Now equip A, Band X with the topologies with respect to which they are Borel 
subsets of Polish spaces and let Z = A >< B >< X have the resulting product topology. 
Finally, give H = zN the product of copies of this topology on Zand let iaH be the Borel 
CJ-field generated by this product topology on H. 
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Measurable strategies a and 't, together with an initial state x, induce via the Ionescu 
Tulcea theorem a countably additive probability measure i\,a,-r on iaH. The expected 
payoff to I is then Ju* dP x,a,t· Let us denote this game by nc(x). It was proved in [7] that 
7\:(x) has a value for each initial state x. 
Suppose now that we fix, for each triple (x,a,b) e Xx Ax B, a finitely additive 
extension of q(•lx,a,b) to the power-set of X. Denote the extension by the same symbol 
q(•lx,a,b). Then, according to Theorem 2.1, the game 71.(u)(x) has a value for every x e 
X. A natural question then is whether the values of 71.(u)(x) and 7\:(u)(x) coincide for 
every x e X. If these values are the same, then one can ask if the players have good 
measurable strategies which work against all strategies of the opponent, measurable or 
nonmeasurable. The rest of the paper is devoted to answering both questions in the 
affirmative under conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (v) above and the following strengthening of 
(iv): 
· (iv') For every fixed Borel subset E of X and x e X, the family {q(Elx,a,•): a e A) is 
equicontinuous on B. 
7. One-shot games 
As a first step towards the solution of the problems posed in the previous section, 
we study one-shot games and prove that, under appropriate conditions, the values of such 
games remain the same whether the players use only countably additive mixed strategies or 
use finitely additive ones. The key to the proof of this result is a "Fubini" - type theorem 
for finitely additive probability measures. 
Theorem 7 .1. Let (Q,Gl) be a measurable space, let Y be a compact metric space and 
denote by lSy the Borel a-field of Y. Suppose that tis a bounded, real-valued function ~n 
n x Y such that {f(co,•): oo e Q} is equicontinuous on Y and 1(•,y) is <12-measurable for 
every ye Y. Let µ,v be finitely additive probability measures on Gl,lSy, respectively. 
Then 
II rcro,y> dµ(ro) dv(y) = II r<ro,y) dv<y> dµ<ro>. 
Sketch of proof. First, note that the iterated integrals above are meaningful. Indeed, the 
map y-+ J r(co,y) dµ(ro) is continuous on Y, as can be seen by using the equicontinuity of 
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(1(c.o,•): c.o e '2). Next, use the Riesz representation theorem to get a countably additive 
probability measure v* on llay such that 
Jg dv =Jg dv* 
for every real-valued, continuous function g on Y. Hence, the map co~ J t(co,y) dv(y) = 
J 1(c.o,y) dv*(y) is <12-measurable on n. In order to prove the equality of the iterated 
integrals, use the hypotheses to prove that for £ > 0, there is a finite <12-measurable partition 
{'21,n2, ••• ,ilml of il and a finite llay- measurable partition (Y1,Y2,···,Ynl ofY such 
that if (co,y) and (co',y') both belong to Qi x Yj, then 
11(co,y) - 1(co',y')I < e. D 
The result on one-shot games follows. 
Theorem 7.2. Let (Q,<Jl) be a measurable space, let Y be a compact metric space with 
Borel a-field ZSy. Let g be a bounded, real-valued function on n x Y such that 
{g(c.o,•): c.o e Q} is equicontinuous on Y and g(•,y) is <12-measurable for every ye Y. 
Then there is a real number v such that 
(a) for every £ > 0, there is a countably additive probability measure µ* on Q2 such that for 
all finitely additive probability measures v on ZSy 
JJ g(co,y) dµ*(co) dv(y) = JJ g(co,y) dv(y) dµ*(co) ~ v-£, 
(b) there is a countably additive probability measure v* on ZSy such that for all finitely 
additive probability measures µ on al 
JJ g(co,y) dµ(co) dv*(y) = If g(co,y) dv*(y) dµ(co) s v. 
Proof. Use Theorem 2 from Ky Fan [4] and Theorem 7.1. D 
Theorem 7.2 states that the one-shot game with payoff g(co,y) has the same value 
whether the players play mixed strategies which are finitely additive or use only countably 
additive mixed strategies. Moreover, the order of integration in evaluating the payoff is 
22 
irrelevant, even when finitely additive mixed strategies are used. Finally, both players have 
good strategies which are countably additive. 
From this point onwards, we will assume that conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv') and (v) 
are in force for the rest of the paper. Furthermore, for each countably additive probability 
measure on the Borel a-field of X(A)(B), we fix a finitely additive extension to the power-
set of X(A)(B). 
We now consider the games Cll(cp)(x), x e X, when cp is a bounded, upper analytic 
function on X. These games were introduced with arbitrary cp in section 4. Recall that 
(Scp)(x) is the value of the game Cll(cp)(x) when both players use finitely additive mixed 
strategies. 
Theorem 7 .3. Let cp be a bounded, upper analytic function on X. Then Sep is an upper 
analytic function. For every e > 0, there is a universally measurable function f: X -+ P c(A) 
such that for every x e X 
(7.1) inf HJ <p(x1) q(dx11x,a,b) f(x)(da) v(db) ~ (Scp)(x) - e. veP(B) 
Moreover, there is a universally measurable function g: X-+ Pc(B) such that for every 
xe X 
(7.2) sup HJ <p(x
1
) q(dx
1
1x,a,b) µ(da) g(x)(db) S (S<p)(x). 
µeP(A) 
Proof. According to a result of Nowak [8, Theorem 5.1], there is an upper analytic 
function V on X, a universally measurable function g: X -+ P c(B) and, given E > 0, a 
universally measurable function f: X -+ P c(A) such that 
(7.3) J <p(x1) q(dx1lx,a,b) f(x)(da) ~ V(x)- E 
for all be Band all x e X, and 
(7.4) J <p(x1) q(dx1lx,a,b) g(x) (db) S V(x) 
for all a e A and all x e X. 
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Ifwe now integrate (7.3) with respect to any v E P(B), we get (7.1) with (Sq>)(x) 
replaced by V(x). On the other hand, integrate (7.4) with respect to anyµ E P(A) and 
interchange the order of integration to get (7.2), again with (S<p)(x) replaced by V(x). To 
justify interchange of the order of integration, apply Theorem 7 .1 with n = A, Cl2 = the a-
field on A generated by the analytic subsets of A, Y =Band 
t(a,b) = J <p(x1) q(dx1lx,a,b), a E A, b E B. 
That 1 satisfies the equicontinuity condition in Theorem 7 .1 follows from condition (iv') of 
section 6 by standard arguments. 
The proof is concluded by observing now that V must be Sq>. D 
8. Leavable games 
We now consider the "leavable" games .Z:(q>)(x) and _z:*(<p)(x), XE X, when q> is a 
bounded, upper analytic function on X. These games with arbitrary q> were studied in 
section 4. 
Suppose cr,'t are measurable strategies for players I and II, respectively. For fixed 
XE X, _er and 't together detennine a countably additive probability measure P x,a,'t on the a-
field 28 via the Ionescu Tulcea theorem, as was mentioned in section 6. On the other 
hand, since all countably additive probability measures on X,A,B, have been extended to 
the respective power-sets, a,'t also qualify as strategies in the sense of section 2. Hence, 
as described in section 2, cr,'t induce a finitely additive probability measure Px,a,'t on the 
Borel a-field ~H, generated by the product of copies of the discrete topology on Z. It was 
proved in [10, Theorem 6.1] that i\,a,'t = Px,a,t on ~H- In the sequel, therefore, we will 
-
write Px,a,'t for Px,a;t· 
We remind the reader that conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv') and (v) of section 6 are in 
force. 
Lemma 8.1. For every n = 0,1,2, ... , the function U0 is upper analytic. Moreover, U = 
sup Un and, consequently, U is upper analytic. [The functions Un and U are defined in 
n 
section 4.] 
fmQ!. The first assertion is proved by induction on n by using the fact noted in Theorem 
7.3 that the operator S preserves bounded, upper analytic functions on X. For the second 
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assenion, note that sup Un~ u and, by (7, Lemma 4.1], sup Un~ S(sup Un). Hence, 
n n n 
U = sup U0 by virtue of Lemma 4.2. D n 
We say that (CJ(x))xeX is a measurable family of strategies for player I if for every 
xeX, CJ(x) is a measurable strategy for I and, for every n ~ 0, (CJ(x))0 (z1,z2, ... ,Zn) is a 
universally measurable mapping from X >< zn to P cCA). One defines a measurable family 
of strategies for player II analogously. A stopping time (stop rule) t is measurable if, for 
every n ~ 0, the set { t S n) is a universally measurable subset of H. A policy for player I 
is a pair ( CJ,t), where CJ is a strategy for I and t a stop rule. A policy ( CJ,t) for I is 
measurable if CJ is a measurable strategy for I and tis a measurable stop rule. We say that 
( CJ(x),t(x))xe x is a measurable family of policies for player I if ( CJ(x))xe x is a measurable 
family of strategies for I, t(x) is a stop rule for every XE X and t(x)(h) is a universally 
measurable function. on X >< H. 
Lemma 8.2. For every n ~ 0 and e > 0, player I has a measurable family of policies 
(~(x),t0(x))xe x such that t0(x) ~ n, XE X, and such that for any strategy (measurable or 
not) 't of II, 
(8.1) E JI (u(x n )) ~ U0 (x) - E 
x,o/x),t t (x) 
for every XE X. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on n and uses Theorem 7 .3 and Lemma 8.1. We omit 
the details as they are easily supplied by examining the proof of (7, Lemma 4.2] and 
Lemma4.4. D 
Lemma 8,3. For every E > 0, player I has a measurable family of policies (CJe(x),te(x))xe x 
such that for any strategy (measurable or not) t of player II 
Ex,ae(x),tCu(x4:(x))) 2= U(x) - £ 
for every xe X. Funhennore, player II has a measurable family of strategies (t(x))xeX 
such that for any policy (measurable or not) (CJ,t) of player I 
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(8.2) 
for every XE X. 
Proof. For xE X, define n(x) to be the least k ~ 0 such that Uk(x) > U(x) - E/2. Use 
Lemma 8.1 to see that n(x) is a universally measurable function of x. For each m ~ 0, 
m 
choose a measurable family of policies (crE12(x),tID(x))xeX for player I such that (8.1) is 
satisfied withe replaced by E/2. Set 
n(x) 
cre(x) = cr e/2 (x) 
It is straightfoiward to verify that (<le(x),te(x))xeX satisfies the assertion of the lemma. 
For the second assertion, use Theorem 7 .3 to fix a universally measurable function 
g: X -+ P c(B) such that 
sup JJJ U(x
1
) q(dx
1
lx,a,b) µ(da) g(x) (db) S (SU)(x). 
µeP(A) 
for every XE X. Let 
t(x)o= g(x) 
Plainly, (t(x))xeX is a measurable family of strategies for II. It is now easy to verify (8.2) 
by induction on j(t) exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.6. D 
Theorem 8.4. For every e > 0, player I has a measurable family of policies 
( <le(x),te(x))xe x, with te(x) ~ 1 for every xe X, such that for any strategy (measurable or 
not) t of player II 
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for every xeX. Moreover, player II has a measurable family of strategies ('t(x))xeX such 
that for any policy (measurable or not) (cr,t) of player I, with t ~ 1, 
for every xe X. 
f[QQf. The proof is exactly like that of Theorem 4.8, except that we use Lemma 8.3 
instead of Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. D 
Theorem 8.4 implies that the game .Z:*(<p)(x) has the same value whether the players 
use measurable strategies or nonmeasurable ones. Funhermore, both players have good 
strategies which are measurable. Another consequence of Theorem 8.4 is the following. 
Corollary 8,5. The operator T maps bounded, upper analytic functions on X to bounded, 
upper analytic functions on X. 
We remind the reader that for an arbitrary bounded function won X, (Tw)(x) was 
defined in section 4 to be the value of the game .Z:*(w)(x) for xeX. 
We now define, as in [7], functions Q;, ~ < ro1, on X by transfinite induction as 
follows: 
Qo = Tu 
and, for ~ > 0, 
Qi:= T(u /\ inf Qn). 
':, fl<l; 'I 
Set 
The main properties of the functions above were established in [7] and are summarized 
below. 
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Theorem 8.6. (a) The functions Q;, ~ < ro1, and Qare upper analytic. 
(b) T(u /\ Q) = Q. 
9. Nonleavable games 
We are now in a position to settle the questions posed in section 6 regarding the 
games n(u)(x) and 7lc(u)(x). 
Theorem 9 .1. For every £ > 0, player I has a measurable family of strategies ( a(x))xe x 
such that for any strategy (measurable or not) 't, 
·(9.1) Ex,a(x),t{u*) ~ Q(x) - e 
for every xEX. 
Proof. We consider the games :t:_*(u /\ Q)(x), XE X. According to Theorem 8.6, 
(T(u /\ Q))(x) = Q(x), xe X. So we can use Theorem 8.4 to choose for each o > 0 a 
measurable family of policies (a(x,6), f(x,6))xex, with t(x,6) ~ 1 for every XE X, such 
that for every strategy (measurable or not) 't of II 
E _ (u{x_ )) ~ Q(x) - e 
x,a(x,6);t t(x,6) 
for every XE X. 
Let 60,61 , ... be positive numbers such that L 60 < e. For each XE X and n ~ 0, set 
n 
a 0 (x) = a(x,60 ), t0 (x) = i(x,60 ). Let a(x) be the sequential composition of (aD,t0 ), n ~ 0, 
at x (see section 5 for the definition of sequential composition). Since the family of policies 
(a0 (x),t0 (x))xeX, n ~ 0, are measurable, it follows that (a(x))xeX is a measurable family of 
strategies. 
To prove (9.1), just imitate the proof of Theorem 5.2, replacing the function <p by 
Q. D 
Theorem 9.2. For every £ > 0 and ~ < ro1, player II has a measurable family of strategies 
(t;'2(x))xe x such that for any strategy (measurable or not) a of player I 
(9.2) E 3 £( )(u*) ~ Qz;(x) + e X,G,~• X 
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for every XE X. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on ~- Consider the case when ~ = 0. Use Theorem 8.4 
to choose a measurable family of strategies (~(x))xe x, which is optimal for II in the games 
_z:*(u)(x), XE X, that is, for any policy (a,t) of I, with t ~ 1, 
(9.3) 
for every XE X. 
Set 
E _ (u(xt)) S ~(x) 
x,a;t(x) 
t<>,E(x) = t(x), xe X. 
Fix XE X and let a be a strategy for I. Then 
* * E 
O 
e (u ) = E _ (u ) 
x,a,t , (x) x,a,t(x) 
S sup E -, )(u(xt)) 
~l X,O',t,X 
s Q0(x), 
where the first inequality is by virtue of Lemma 5.1 and the second by virtue of (9.3). 
For the inductive step, let l; > 0 and assume that the result is true for all 11 < l;. Use 
Theorem 8.4 once again to choose a measurable family (~(x))xe x of optimal strategies for 
II in the games .Z:*(u /\ inf QT\)(x), XE X. Let 
T\<; 
where inf(4>) = oo. 
Then t is a measurable stopping time. 
For 11 < l;, let 
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Cq = {xe X: Q11(x) < (inf Qc)(x) + £/4 }. 
~<; 
Clearly, the sets~ are universally measurable. Define J,£ as follows: 
and, for n ~ 1, 
Tl,£/4 
= t (x_) _(z_ ,z_ , ... ,zn), 
t n-t t+l t+2 
if n ~ t(h) & x_ E en -u t C t ' 
l 'I 11 <J1 Tl 
where h = (z1 ,z2, ... ). 
Clearly, (~'E(x))xeX is a measurable family of strategies. 
Fix XE X and let er be a strategy for player I. To prove (9.2), just repeat the proof 
of Theorem 5.3 with i nf Q11 playing the role of V. D 11<; 
Corollary 9.3. Let£> 0. Player I has a measurable family of strategies (er(x))xeX such 
that for every strategy (measurable or not) 't of II 
Ex,a(x);r(u*) ~ Q(x) - £ 
for every XE X. Player II has a measurable family of strategies ('t(x))xe x such that for 
every strategy (measurable or not) er of I 
Ex,a,-c(x)(u*) S Q(x) + e 
for every xe X. 
Proof. The first assertion is just Theorem 9 .1. For the second assertion, let 
C; = {xeX: Q;(x) = Q(x)}, l; < 001. 
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Define 
where 't;,e is defined in Theorem 9 .2. It is proved in [7, Corollary 6.5] that ( t(x) )xe x is a 
measurable family of strategies. 
Finally, fix xeX and let cr be a strategy for I. If x e C~ - u11<~½1 for~< co1, then 
E ( )(u*) = E ,: (u*) X,O','t X X,O','t,-,,E(x) 
~Q;(X) +£ 
= Q(x) + £, 
where the inequality is by virtue of Theorem 9 .2. D 
Corollary 9.3 states that the games n(u)(x) and nc<u)(x) have the same value Q(x). 
Moreover, both players have good measurable strategies in n(u)(x), xe X. Hence, the 
value function Q can be calculated entirely in terms of measurable strategies, so that the 
finitely additive extensions fixed for countably additive measures in section 7 are irrelevant 
insofar as the value is concerned. 
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